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Abstract
Exorbitant price increases for critical off-patent medicines have received considerable media attention in recent
months, leading to an investigation by the U.S. Senate. However, much of this attention has focused upon the
companies that initiated the price increases, all of whom had recently acquired the drugs in question. Overlooked
are upstream interventions with the originators of these drugs to prevent generics trolling in the first place. Using
the particular example of Eli Lilly and Company’s efforts to divest itself of cycloserine, a flawed process that paved
the way for the recent price hike by Rodelis Therapeutics, this article highlights the responsibilities of drug
originators, and safeguards to ensure similar rights transfers do not affect ongoing affordable access.
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Correspondence/findings
In the fall of 2015, to the surprise and dismay of clinicians
and their patients, the North American price of cycloseri-
ne—a WHO Essential Medicine for multidrug-resistant
tuberculosis (MDR-TB)—increased from about $500 to
$10,800 for thirty 250 mg capsules, or close to $800,000
per patient (assuming 750 mg/day for 2 years) [1].
The cycloserine debacle exemplifies a disturbing new
trend of generic drug trolling, where companies acquire
the marketing and manufacturing rights for off-patent,
critical medicines with a single source (so a de facto
monopoly) and raise prices astronomically. In this
instance, North American rights around cycloserine had
just been acquired by Rodelis Therapeutics. Around the
same time, Turing Pharmaceuticals obtained similar
North American rights for pyrimethamine, another
WHO Essential Medicine, and jacked up the price by
more than 5500 % overnight, in the process creating the
quintessential poster boy for pharmaceutical company
greed in then-CEO Martin Shkreli [2].
This unscrupulous rent-seeking—with none of these
drugs have the trolling companies offered any new
innovation other than in their pricing strategies—has
drawn considerable media and political attention. Not
only has generics trolling helped fuel a broader conver-
sation about pharmaceutical pricing in the United States
as part of the current U.S. presidential campaign, the
companies above were called to testify before a U.S.
Senate Commission [3]. Even more importantly, numer-
ous policy suggestions have emerged, ranging from
simplifying FDA processes to promote market entry for
generic competitors, to tackling anticompetitive behaviors
used to impede competition, to easing restrictions on
importation of foreign sources [4].
While these suggestions may all contribute to improving
pharmaceutical access and pricing, we suggest that an
important complementary strategy is to address the
upstream conditions that have allowed generics trolling to
occur in the first place. These conditions arise from
the irresponsible divestment of critical drugs by the
original innovators.
The case of cycloserine illustrates how this can
occur even under the guise of a philanthropic effort
to promote access. Through Eli Lilly and Company’s
MDR-TB Partnership, which Lilly describes in a
report as “the largest philanthropic undertaking in the
company’s history” [5], Lilly offloaded two unprofit-
able drugs—cycloserine and capreomycin—onto seven
generics companies in different territories by transfer-
ring manufacturing know-how, marketing rights, and
other intellectual property (e.g. cycloserine’s trademark,
Seromycin®). In North America, Lilly completely divested
exclusive rights to cycloserine to Purdue University’s Chao
Center. This 2007 transfer made Chao the only North* Correspondence: ahous062@uottawa.ca
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American supplier until August 2015, when Chao unex-
pectedly re-transferred cycloserine to Rodelis. Rodelis
promptly hiked its price twenty-fold. Protests ensued, by
us and others, until Chao announced on September 21,
2015 that it had regained the rights to cycloserine and
would reduce the price to $1050—a bittersweet outcome,
given this is still double their original price from the
month before [6].
A similar pattern—divestment, multiple changes in own-
ership, and ultimately massive price-hikes after being ac-
quired by trolls—occurred for GlaxoSmithKline’s (GSK)
pyrimethamine (Daraprim®), although GSK’s divestment
held no pretense of philanthropy. Yet while Andrew Witty,
CEO of GSK, criticized Turing’s price increase, he failed to
acknowledge that it was GSK’s divestment from this drug
that allowed Turing to acquire it in the first place [7].
Ultimately, these divestments have taken place with insuffi-
cient measures in place to ensure continued, affordable
access. They impose no price ceilings or other conditions
for the future, but instead relinquish control over pricing
and access decisions, freeing the successor companies to
price-gouge at will.
In 2001, the average price Lilly charged for cycloserine
in high-income countries was $3.38 per capsule—a very
far cry from the $35 they cost from the Chao Center, let
alone the $360 that Rodelis briefly charged in North
America [8]. Pity the unfortunate patients in the Canadian
and U.S. markets, for whom “the largest philanthropic
undertaking in [Lilly’s] history” has resulted in prices that
seem decidedly misanthropic. Lilly does not deny this
problem, and writes, in the same report noted above, “that
current prices for MDR-TB medicines are now, in some
cases, higher than they were when Lilly’s was subsidizing
the price. However, while prices have not fallen in all cases
for patients, the cost of production has fallen as a result of
technology transfer.” In short, patients might pay more,
but it is costing the manufacturers less.
We asked Lilly why it gave the successor companies
unlimited discretion over cycloserine pricing. In responses
to us and the New York Times, Lilly answered that anti-
trust rules prohibited it having downstream control over
cycloserine’s price. It is not clear what rule Lilly is refer-
ring to, particularly given that common sense also opposes
this idea: Lilly’s decision to stop selling and earning
revenue off cycloserine made it a mere bystander in that
market, and therefore unlikely to be guilty of criminally
rigging the market (in favor of consumers, no less).
We believe that Lilly and other drug companies that
choose to relieve themselves of manufacturing responsi-
bilities for an important medicine need to do so in an
ethical and responsible manner. Responsibility to one’s
invention and to public health each require companies
to plan thoughtfully for what will happen to their prod-
uct after they no longer manufacture it. Indeed, the
decision to stop manufacturing a crucial drug, even one
serving only a small market, should itself be carefully
considered. It is certainly not unreasonable to expect
that corporate good citizenry should encompass continu-
ing to ensure access to vital legacy drugs serving a critical
market. In an era where “Big Pharma” is increasingly used
as a pejorative, it also makes good sense for drug origina-
tors to embrace, rather than discard, important legacy
drugs. Highlighting a product worthy of being deemed an
“essential medicine” is something that could only improve
public perceptions—provided it comes with commitments
to affordable, ongoing access.
Should a company wish to license other manufacturers
to lighten the financial burden of serving the market,
that is entirely acceptable, but it is our view that origin-
ator suppliers remain ethically bound to ensure a stable,
safe, and adequate supply. If they choose to divest,
companies should at the very least include some form of
enduring price ceiling (there are many options) in any
agreement that transfers marketing rights to a generics
company, lest that successor, or as has frequently been
the case the successor’s successors, abuse their discre-
tion to price-gouge patients. It also makes good sense to
be mindful of the size of relevant markets when dividing
such rights between multiple parties internationally to
help ensure the sustainability of the transfer; it seems
obvious that carving off a tiny market—like North
America—to a manufacturer without any track record
and few if any other products in its portfolio would
almost inevitably have to result in higher prices. Indeed,
this is why merely calling for increased domestic compe-
tition is an overly simplistic approach. The vulnerability
that generics trolls exploit is that the previous manufac-
turer is seeking to disavow themselves of production
responsibilities precisely because it is not sufficiently
profitable, even as a sole-supplier; in the above cases,
this has been true not only for the originator but also
for the initial successor rights-holder. The market for
these drugs is frequently too small to sustain multiple
suppliers or promote competition at the national or
regional level.
Thus, maintaining access to important legacy drugs
serving crucial patient markets, not simply the bottom
line, should form a part of corporate responsibility and
ethics. Nevertheless, circumstances may still warrant
some degree of market intervention by governments,
even before a troll has taken advantage of the situation.
Drug manufacturers in the United States are currently
required to notify the government of the discontinuance
or interruption in the production of life-saving drugs [9].
Foreign importation has been permitted in response to
such shortages. Such a principle, including foreign import-
ation when necessary, could be expanded to ensure that
any divestment of a critical drug not have a detrimental
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effect on access, both physical and financial. There is
precedent in other fields for protecting critical access
during transfer; for instance, the transfer of airport slots
between airlines requires the determination “that the
transfer will not be injurious to the essential air service
program” [10]. This may also be a more politically palat-
able solution than opening the broader pharmaceutical
market to foreign suppliers, although that approach also
offers benefits worth considering.
The current state of affairs is such that the system
remains vulnerable to unscrupulous trolls preying upon
small markets served by a sole-source supplier. This
essentially inverts the common stereotype of what makes
pharmaceuticals unaffordable, as drugs that were afford-
able under their originators explode in price on the
generic market. At the root of the problem are drug
originators like Lilly and GSK, who sully their past inno-
vations through irresponsibly off-loading manufacturing
responsibilities. They are also the best positioned to
prevent similar occurrences in the future. While measures
like addressing obstacles to increased generic competition
have an important role in lowering drug prices, they are
not a complete solution, particularly for tiny, vulnerable
markets. Preventing the problem through more respon-
sible and ethical divestment practices is preferable to
treating it after it occurs.
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